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CHAPTER 7 
Domestic Relations 
MONROE L. INKER 
A. CouRT DECISIONS 
§7.1. The "stubborn child" law. In Commonwealth v. Brasher1 
the Supreme Judicial Court considered the constitutionality of a stat-
ute2 providing for punishment of "stubborn children," that is, child-
ren who stubbornly disobey their parents or other persons having 
authority to give the child lawful and reasonable commands. The 
Court held that the statute is not so vague and indefinite as to violate 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and is not an un-
constitutional intrusion into the privacy of family life. 
For a thorough and thoughtful discussion of the Brasher case and of 
judicial reaction to "stubborn child" laws in other jurisdictions, see 
the student comment in §7 .11 infra. 
§7.2. Guardian of minor: Parent and child. Petition of Kauch 1 
involved a father's appeal from a final decree of the probate court dis-
missing his petition for the guardianship and custody of his two minor 
children (both boys) and awarding custody to the sister of his deceased 
wife. Mr. Kauch and his wife were divorced in 1965 by decree of a Flor-
ida court, and she was granted custody of the children. Thereafter she 
moved to Massachusetts with them and continued to live here until her 
death in 1968. After the divorce, Mr. Kauch lived with his widowed 
mother in Virginia. In dismissing the father's petition, the probate 
judge was lavish in his praise for the type of home life which the ma-
ternal aunt and her husband would afford to the boys. He found their 
personal needs would be more than adequately provided for out of the 
income from their mother's estate, whether they lived with their mater-
nal aunt or with their father. The boys, who were 14 and 10 years of age 
at the time of their mother's death, expressed love for their father but 
preferred to live with their aunt. For the foregoing reasons, and because 
he believed it to be in the best interests of the children, the probate 
judge awarded custody to the maternal aunt. He noted, however, that 
the father was "a man of good character and with a sincere love and 
concern for the boys. "2 
MoNROE L. INKER is a member of the firm of Crane, Inker & Oteri, Boston, and is an in· 
structor in law at Boston College Law School. 
§7.1. '1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 907,270 N.E.2d389. 
2G.L., c. 272, §53. 
§7.2. 1 1970Mass.Adv.Sh.l471,264N.E.2d371. 
2 Id. at 1472,264 N.E.2dat372. 
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The sole question before the Supreme Judicial Court was whether 
the findings of the probate judge should in law require a different de-
cree. As stated by the Court, "The settled law, founded on express leg-
islative policy ... is that a parent is not to be deprived of the cus-
tody of his child in the absence of a finding that he is unfit."3 The 
Court pointed out that there had been no express finging by the pro-
bate judge that the father was unfit; on the contrary, the judge had 
spoken favorably of him. Accordingly, the Court found sufficient 
reason to reverse the decree of the probate judge and to award custody 
of the children to the father. 
Aside from the merits of this particular case, the approach taken by 
the Supreme Judicial Court seems undesirable. Children of divorced 
parents may be separated from one of their parents for a substantial 
period of time and may be expected to develop ties and attachments 
which should not be lightly treated. In such a situation it is particu-
larly important that the best interests of the children be considered. 
Unfortunatley, in Kauch the Supreme Judicial Court adopted a limited 
approach: "Nearly all the relevant cases have considered the best inter-
ests of the child in determining whether the parents are unfit."4 The 
maternal aunt, however, had sought to have the Court adopt a broader 
approach: that the best interests of the children should be considered 
even if Mr. Kauch was not found unfit. In support of this approach, 
counsel for the maternal aunt called the Court's attention to Ridgeway 
v. Cels, 5 in which the Supreme Judicial Court awarded custody of two 
minor children to the father, reversing the probate judge's award of 
custody to the maternal grandmother. The following language in 
Ridgeway was specifically referred to: 
His [the father's] common law rights and obligations revived upon 
the death of the mother, and as he is not unfit to have custody the 
only issue is whether the best interests of the children require that 
he not have custody.6 
The Cour~ responded that to whatever extent the quoted language 
departed from its conclusion in this case, it was to be disregarded. This 
statement is unsound in that it implies that the child's best interests are 
sometimes not material. The legislative standard of parental unfitness, 
as embodied in G.L., c. 210, §5, should not be construed as exclusive. 
In custody proceedings the central inquiry should always be con-
3 Id. at 1474, 264 N.E.2d at 373. This principle is embodied in G.L., c. 201, §5, which 
provides in part: "The probate court may, upon the written consent of the parents or 
surviving parent, order that the guardian shall have such custody [of a minor]; and may 
so order if, upon a hearing and after such notice to the parents or surviving parent as it 
may order, it finds such parents, jointly, or the surviving parent, unfit to have such cus-
tody .... " See also People ex rei. Scarpetta v. Spence-Chapin Adoption Agency, 28 
N.Y.2d 185,269 N.E.2d 787, 321 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1971); Kropp v. Shepsky, 305 N.Y. 465, 113 
N.E.2d801 (1953). 
' 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1471, 1473,264 N.E.2d 371,373. 
5 350 Mass. 274,214 N.E.2d 31 (1966). 
6 Id. at 281,214 N .E.2d at 35. 
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cerned with what is best for the child. Richards v. Forest/ a decision 
relied upon by the Court in the present case, contained the following 
declaration: 
The law recognizes and enforces underlying principles and obli-
gations to maintain the family. These principles must yield to con-
siderations touching the general public good based on the need 
and advantage of the child. In the present context, the word "un-
fit" has implications with respect to the child as well as to the 
parent. . . . It has been said that the first and paramount duty of 
courts is to consult the welfare of the child. To that governing 
principle every other public and private consideration must 
yield.8 
One could hardly ask for a more forceful statement to the effect that 
the best interests of the child are to receive primary consideration in 
custody awards. 
The Court in Kauch also relied upon Barry v. Sparks9 for the propo-
sition that upon the death of the mother, the father's common law 
right to the custody of the boys revived. However, it should be noted 
that in Barry the Supreme Judicial Court also said: 
The father was then entitled to the custody of the child ... un-
less it should be shown that he was unfit to be his custodian or 
that the best interests of the child required otherwise . ... The 
right of all parents to the custody of their children is subject to 
such conditions. 10 [Emphasis added.] 
Barry is only one in a line of Massachusetts cases11 which hold that 
the best interests of the child must be consulted in determining cus-
tody. In all of those cases, the Supreme Judicial Court appears to have 
undertaken a twofold inquiry: a determination of the parents' fitness 
and a consideration of the child's best interests. In the simplest case, 
the best interests of the children will be served by awarding custody to 
the parent(s). Sometimes, however, a father who has no physical inca-
pacity and is guilty of no moral impropriety may be technically fit to 
have custody of his children, yet the best interests of the children may 
require that the father be denied custody. While the Court in Kauch 
properly noted that the father was not technically unfit to have custody 
of his children, it did not expressly overturn the probate judge's find-
ing that the best interests of the children would be served by awarding 
custody to their maternal aunt. If this means that the Court considers 
the natural father's custodial right to be more important than the best 
interests of the children, it is an unfortunate result. 
§7.3. Adoption: Revocation of consent. In In re Revocation of Ap-
1 278 Mass. 547, 180 N.E.508 (1932). 
8 Id.at553, 180N.E.at511. 
9 306 Mass. 80, 27 N .E.2d 728 ( 1940). 
10 I d. at 84, 27 N .E.2d at 731. 
11 Ridgeway v. Cels, 350 Mass. 274, 214 N.E.2d 31 (1966); Wilkins v. Wilkins, 324 
Mass. 261, 85 N.E.2d 768 (1949); Cessen v. Cessen, 315 Mass. 35, 51 N.E.2d 5 (1943). 
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pointment of Guardian,' the Supreme Judicial Court dealt with the 
question of whether a mother could revoke her written consent to sur-
render her child for adoption. The petitioner was 20 years old and un-
married at the time of her child's birth. Prior to the birth, the mother 
had conferred by telephone with represen~atives of the Common-
wealth's Division of Child Guardianship in the Department of Public 
Welfare (hereinafter referred to as the division). The representatives 
explained to her the various ways in which she or her expected child 
could be aided: (1) welfare aid to the mother, (2) temporary care of the 
child in a foster home, or (3) surrender of the child for adoption. After 
considering the options, the mother decided to resort to a direct adop-
tive placement. About one month before the birth of the child, the 
mother was visited by a representative of the division who sought to 
insure that the mother was certain about her decision. Shortly after the 
birth of the child, the mother was informed by the division that if she 
still desired to surrender the child for adoption, it was essential that 
she sign releases so that the division· might go ahead with adoption pro-
cedures. The mother thereupon signed a release that she acknowledged 
before a notary, and the child was placed in the home of a childless mar-
ried couple on October 16, 1969, three days after its birth. 
About three months later the mother filed a petition, and the probate 
court entered a decree, for her appointment as guardian of the child. 
The probate court dismissed a subsequent petition by the division to 
vacate the decree of appointment. On appeal, the Supreme Judicial 
Court held that absent any emergency, the division was entitled to 
prompt revocation of the decree because it had been entered improper-
ly, without notice to the division. More importantly, the Court noted 
that under G.L., c. 210, §§2 and 3, once the mother has executed a writ-
ten instrument consenting to surrender the child for direct placement 
for adoption, her consent to a particular adoption is not required. The 
Court concluded, therefore, that because consent had not been set aside 
as involuntary, the mother should not have been permitted to interfere 
with the division's custody. 
Although on the pleadings the precise issue before the probate court 
was "whether the decree appointing the mother as guardian should be 
revoked,"2 in effect the probate court considered the case "on the issue 
whether the mother might properly revoke her consent to placing the 
child for adoption."3 Assuming that the issue of revocation of consent 
had been fully tried by the probate court, the Supreme Judicial Court 
concluded that the mother had not sustained the burden of showing 
that her consent should have been set aside because the surrender was 
(a) involuntary and made without full understanding or (b) made under 
duress.4 The evidence showed that the division had fully explained to 
the mother the consequences of consenting to the child's adoption and 
§7.3. 1 1971 Mass.Adv.Sh.l223,271 N.E.2d62l. 
2 Id. at 1226,271 N.E.2dat623. 
3 Ibid. 
4 See In re Surrender of Minor Children, 344 Mass. 230, 181 N.E.2d 836 (1962). 
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surrendering the child for that purpose. The pressure of the circum-
stances did not make the surrender involuntary. The Court noted that 
although surrender of one's child is a cause of great emotional and 
mental stress, no statute has said that a surrender is valid only if execut-
ed free from the emotions, tensions, and pressure caused by the situa-
tion. 
Moreover, the Court felt that the child's environment and sense of 
security should not be disturbed without a clear showing of significant 
benefit to him. Voluntary surrenders may not be revoked, even with 
the assent of the probate judge, solely on considerations of justice to the 
mother and without regard to the welfare of the child. It is the welfare 
of the child which must come first; the interests of the natural parent(s) 
in such a case are subordinate.5 The Court also stressed the fact that 
the child, who was more than a year and a half old at the time the ap-
peal was heard, had been living with the adoptive parents for a sub-
stantial period of time.6 
The issue in Revocation, namely, whether a mother who has surren-
dered her child to an authorized adoption agency may regain the child's 
custody, has received varied treatment in the courts and legislatures of 
other states. 7 At one extreme, several jurisdictions adhere to the rule 
that the natural parent has an absolute right to regain custody of the 
child prior to a final adoption decree.8 On the other hand, some juris-
dictions adhere to the rule that the parent's surrender of the child is 
final, absent fraud or duress.9 The majority, however, place the parent's 
right to regain custody within the discretion of the court. 10 Such a 
discretionary rule avoids the oqvious dangers posed by inflexibility, 
while at the same time allowing the courts leeway to approve a revoca-
tion of the surrender when the facts of an individual case so warrant. 
The Revocation decision seems to be essentially sound. There is 
clearly a substantial public interest in the development and protection 
of a system for promoting the adoption of children who are in need of 
5 Id. at237, 181 N.E.2dat840. 
6 It should be noted, however, that the mother's attempt to get her child back actually 
began less than three months after the child was born. In People ex rei. Scarpetta v. 
Spence-Chapin Adoption Agency, 28 N.Y.2d 185, 269 N.E.2d 787, 321 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1971) 
(the "Baby Lenore" case), the New York court ordered the return of an adopted child to 
its natural mother where the natural mother had requested the child's return only 23 days 
after surrendering the child to the adoption agency and only 5 days after the child had 
been received by the adoptive parents. Ten months of litigation followed her request for 
the return of the child, and during that time the child remained in the possession of the 
adoptive parents. The court in Scarpetta relied in large part for its holding on the rele-
vant state statutes. 
7 Katz, Law of Adoption, 51 Geo. L.J. 64, 87 (1962); Comment, Revocation of Paren-
tal Consent to Adoption: Legal Doctrine and Social Policy, 28 U. Chi. L. Rev. 564 
(1961). 
8 E.g., In re Baby Girl Larson, 252 Minn. 490, 91 N.W.2d 448 (l9S8); but cf. Minn. 
Stat. §259.24(6) (1969). 
9 E.g., Catholic Charities v. Harper, 161 Tex. 21, 337 S.W.2d Ill (1960); Gonzales v. 
Toma, 330 Mich. 35, 46 N.W.2d 453 (1951); La. Civ. Code Ann., art. 9, §404 (1965). 
lOKatz, Law of Adoption, 51 Geo. L.J. 64, 88 (1962), citing as one example N.Y. Soc. 
Serv. Law §§383, 384 (McKinney 1966). 
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care and affection. It would be detrimental to that system if prospective 
adoptive parents could not reasonably rely upon retaining custody of 
children placed with them should such a trial relationship prove suc-
cessful. A heavy burden of persuasion should be imposed upon a parent 
who, having received a full explanation of the consequences, makes a 
written consent and later seeks to revoke it after it has been relied upon 
by both the division and the prospective adoptive parents. The Su-
preme Judicial Court also seems to have taken a reasonable approach 
in holding that the child's environment and sense of security should 
not be disturbed without a clear showing of significant benefit to him. 
Indeed, in a situation in which the parents have voluntarily surrender-
ed a child for adoption and the child has been residing for a substantial 
period of time with adoptive parents who have proved satisfactory to 
the Division of Child Guardianship, it is certainly arguable either that 
the natural parents should never be allowed to withdraw their consent 
or that their withdrawal of consent should be predicated, at the very 
least, upon a clear showing of substantial benefit to the child. 
§7.4. Separate support: Sale of real estate. In Gould v. Gould,' 
the Supreme Judicial Court modified a decree of the probate court en-
tered upon a petition for separate support that had been filed under 
G.L., c. 209, §32. The respondent husband had appealed from that por-
tion of the decree which ordered the sale of the "home place" owned by 
the parties as tenants by the entirety and the division of the proceeds 
into equal shares. The purpose of the sale was to provide the wife with 
a "security blanket" of cash in addition to the money she was to receive 
under the terms of the separate support agreement. The Court felt com-
pelled to strike these provisions from the decree, based upon earlier de-
cisions holding that under Section 32 a judge is without authority to 
order a husband to convey to his wife his interest in real estate owned 
by them as tenants by the entirety as security for his compliance with 
orders for support.2 The decisions relied on had also held that in a sit-
uation such as the one before the Court in Gould, a court could not 
provide for a division of the property of the husband. 3 These cases are 
grounded on the principle that "A separate support proceeding is de-
signed to secure the 'temporary support' of a wife; the decree does not 
create a judicial separation, nor establish a permanent status for the 
future." 4 The allowance to the wife is thus viewed simply as a recogni-
tion of her legal right to be supported by her husband. Because the Court 
in Gould found the provisions for the wife's support to be entirely ade-
quate without the sale of the real estate, it held that such a sale could 
not be ordered. The Court did uphold a provision of the decree grant-
ing to the wife, for her use in her apartment, necessary furniture and 
furnishings which were contained in the "home place," as well as the 
radio, television set, stereo, and records. This provision of the decree 
§7.4. 1 1971 Mass.Adv.Sh.315,267N.E.2d652. 
2 E.g., Dunnington v. Dunnington, 324 Mass. 610, 612, 87 N.E.2d 847, 849 (1949). 
3 Coev. Coe, 313 Mass. 232, 46N.E.2d 1017 (1943). 
4 Gould v. Gould, 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 315,317,267 N.E.2d652,655. 
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was regarded as incidental to the order for support, in that the award of 
the use of such personal property was entirely consistent with the con-
cept of temporary support. 
Although the Supreme Judicial Court reaffirmed in Gould the rule 
that in a proceeding for separate support the probate court has no pow-
er to order the sale of real estate in order to provide a cash" security blan-
ket'' for the wife, such a sale clearly c~m be ordered where it is necessary 
to provide adequate separate support. "The court may make further 
orders relative to the support of the wife and the care, custody and 
maintenance of their minor children. "5 Property of the husband may 
be attached once a petition for separate support has been filed, 6 and the 
General Laws also provide that: 
Whenever in any proceeding [for separate support] under section 
thirty-two a decree shall be entered directing that a deed, convey-
ance, or release of certain real estate, or interest therein, be made, 
such decree shall create an equitable right to its enforcement ... 
in the party entitled thereto by the decree, and if the decree has not 
been complied with within three months after said decree has been 
entered . . . then the decree itself shall operate to vest title to the 
real estate or interest therein . . . as fully and completely as if 
such deed, conveyance or release had been duly executed by the 
party directed to make it, and so recorded.7 
§7.5. Separation agreements: Powerofprobatecourt. In Smith v. 
Smith 1 and Madden v. Madden2 the Supreme Judicial Court applied 
the principle that "a separation agreement does not deprive the Pro-
bate Court of its power to modify its decree relating to alimony for the 
wife or support for the children. "3 In Smith, the husband and wife had 
entered into a separation agreement which was incorporated into the 
divorce decree. Subsequently, the husband filed a petition for modifi-
cation, requesting that the probate court declare the separation null 
and void as collusive and against public policy. Without looking in-
to the validity of the separation agreement, the probate court denied 
the petition solely on the basis that the payments provided in the agree-
ment were "equitable, reasonable, and proper. "4 In affirming the pro-
5 G.L., c. 209, §32. 
6 G.L., c. 209, §33. 
7 G.L., c. 209, §32D, added by Chapter 450 of the Acts of 1970. Note that Section 32 
gives the probate court the power to make the decree, while Section 32D describes the ef-
fect of the decree. 
§7.5. 1 1971 Mass.Adv.Sh. 7,265N.E.2d858. 
21971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 683, 269 N.E.2d 89. This case also considered other issues which 
are not discussed here. 
31971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 7, 9, 265 N.E.2d 858,859. See Buchanan v. Buchanan, 353 Mass. 
351,231 N.E.2d 570 (1967); Kates v. Kates, 347 Mass. 784, 200 N.E.2d 256 (1964); Freeman 
v. Sieve, 323 Mass. 652,84 N.E.2d 16 (1949); Wilson v. Caswell, 272 Mass. 297, 172 N.E. 
251 (1930). The power of the probate court to modify its decrees relating to alimony and 
support derives from G.L., c. 208, §§28, 37. Its parallel power relating to separate support 
derives from G.L., c. 209, §32. 
4 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 7, 9, 265 N.E.2d858, 859. 
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bate court's decision, the Supreme Judicial Court held that since the 
probate court's power to alter the provisions for alimony and support 
could not be abrogated by a separation agreement incorporated in the 
divorce decree, the probate court could decide that the provisions for 
alimony and support were reasonable without looking into the validi-
ty of the separation agreement. "It was only necessary for [the probate 
court] to decide whether the provisions incorporated by reference in the 
original decree should continue or be altered."5 
In Madden, the husband contended that a separation agreement he 
had entered into with his wife was a bar to her petition seeking modifi-
cation and enforcement of a prior decree awarding her separate support 
for herself and their three minor children. By the terms of the separa-
tion agreement, the wife agreed that if the payments provided for there-
in by her husband were duly made, she would not seek any further sup-
port for herself or her children, and that the instrument might be 
pleaded in bar of any petition for that purpose. The Supreme Judicial 
Court held that the parties, by this agreement, could not deprive the 
probate court of its power to make appropriate orders in a separate sup-
port proceeding under G.L., c. 209, §32.6 
B. LEGISLATION 
§7.6. Inheritance rights of adopted children. Chapter 411 of the 
Acts of 1971 clarifies the rights of inheritance of adopted children that 
attach under G.L., c. 191, §22. That section now provides as follows: 
If a devise or legacy is made to a child or other relation of the 
testator, who dies before the testator, but leaves issue surviving the 
testator, such issue shall, unless a different dispositon is made or 
required by the will, take the same estate which the person whose 
issue they are would have taken if he had survived the testator. 
The words "child", "issue", and "other relation", as used in this 
section, shall include adopted children. 
§7.7. Contested hearings: Divorce. Chapter 290 of the Acts of 
1971, by adding Section 8A to G.L., c. 208, permits the entry of a new 
libel for divorce by one party during a contested hearing on the other 
party's libel: 
If during the course of a contested hearing upon a libel for di-
vorce the libellee shall cause to be entered his or her libel for 
divorce the court shall allow the entry of said libel and may enter 
a decree of divorce upon the new libel after the giving of such 
.notice or service to the new libellee as the court, in its discretion, 
shall order. 
§7.8. Adoption petitions: Hearings held in chambers. General 
Laws, c. 210, §6 former1y provided that a hearing on an adoption pe-
tition could be held in chambers, at the discretion of the probate judge, 
if one of the petitioners or some other party to the adoption proceeding 
5 Ibid. 
6 The Court cited Smith v. Smith, n.l supra, and the cases cited in n.3 supra. 
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so requested. Chapter 388 of the Acts of 1971 allows the probate judge 
to act on his own, while making it mandatory that the adoption hear-
ing be held in chambers if any party so requests: 
The probate judge may determine that the hearing on any adop-
tion petition shall be held in chambers. He shall, on the request 
of any party to an adoption proceeding, hold the hearing thereon 
in chambers, except that if said petition is contested, the consent 
of the other party or parties shall be required. 
§7.9. Protection of children who have been injured, maltreated, or 
abused. General Laws, ~· 119, §39A requires physicians to report in-
stances of suspected child abuse in children they examine or treat. 
Chapter 630 of the Acts of 1971 amends Section 39A by adding the fol-
lowing paragraph: "Any physician treating such a child under sixteen 
years shall have the right to keep such child in his custody until such 
time as the custody of the child has been transferred to the custody of 
the division of child guardianship." 
Chapter 630 of the Acts of 1971 further amends G.L., c. 119 by add-
ing Section 39C: 
Any social services worker or school official having reasonable 
cause to suspect that a child under the age of sixteen years has had 
serious physical injury inflicted upon him by other than acciden-
tal means or whose condition gives indication of other serious 
abuse or maltreatment shall report or cause reports to be made to 
the district or juvenile court for the judicial district in the county 
in which such child is a resident and to the department of public 
welfare if his report was made in good faith. Such social services 
worker or school official shall not be liable in an action for slan-
der or libel or guilty of criminal libel. Said report shall not be ad-
missible evidence in any criminal proceeding. 
§7.10. Probate court: Support decrees: Jail sentences. Chapter 275 
of the Acts of 1971 amends G.L., c. 215, §34 by adding the following 
sentence: "A judge of the probate court sentencing a person to jail for 
failure to obey a decree of the court relative to the support of his wife or 
minor children may order that the sentence be served during such hours 
as will permit such person to continue his employment." 
In like manner, Chapter 276 of the Acts of 1971 amends G.L., c. 273, 
§I, relating to desertion and nonsupport, by inserting after the first 
sentence the following: "A judge who orders the imprisonment of a 
person for a violation of this section may order that his sentence be 
served during such hours as will permit said person to continue his 
employment." 
C. STUDENT COMMENT 
§7.11. The "stubborn child" law: Law and order in the home. 
In Commonwealth v. Brasher1 the appellant, Dianne Brasher, was 
§7.11. 1 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 907,270 N.E.2d389. 
9
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adjudged a delinquent child shortly after reaching her fifteenth birth-
day. At that time she was living at the Deaconness Home, a foster care 
facility. On several occasions she had purportedly been absent from 
the home without authorization, and minor disciplinary action had 
followed. On May 2, 1969, an employee of the institution ordered the 
girl to visit a physician for a complete physical examination. She re-
fused to comply, "became a little angry, slammed a few doors, and 
refused to obey the request of the house mother not to slam doors and 
not to swear. "2 
Shortly after this incident, the employee filed a complaint against 
Miss Brasher in the Second District Court of Bristol County, alleging 
that she was a "stubborn child" under a Massachusetts statute: 
Stubborn children, runaways, common night walkers, both male 
and female, common railers and brawlers, persons who with 
offensive and disorderly act or language accost or annoy persons 
of the opposite sex, lewd, wanton and lascivious persons in 
speech or behavior, idle and disorderly persons, prostitutes, dis-
turbers of the peace, keepers of noisy and disorderly houses and 
persons guilty of indecent exposure may be punished by im-
prisonment in a house of correction for not more than six months 
or by a fine of not more than two hundred dollars, or by both such 
fine and imprisonment. 3 
A juvenile hearing was held, at which Miss Brasher was found to be a 
delinquent child "by reason of her stubborn refusal to submit to the 
lawful and reasonable commands of a person whose commands she 
was bound to obey."4 
The appeal from this decision was heard at the juvenile session of 
the superior court in Bristol County on July 2, 1969. The presiding 
judge affirmed, ordering the girl into the care and custody of the De-
partment of Youth Services for three years. Execution of the order was 
suspended, however, and the girl was placed on probation on the 
condition that she would stay in a private home in Lowell. 
On June 7, 1971, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed both lower 
court decisions. In an opinion by Justice Quirico, the Court held: (1) 
the Stubborn Child Law represented a valid exercise of the state's 
police power and was not an impermissible intrusion into the privacy 
of the family unit; (2) the language in which the statute was couched 
was not so vague as to deny the appellant due process of law; and (3) 
the evidence was sufficient to sustain a judgment of delinquency under 
the stubborn child law.s 
Although the decision in Brasher has generated a flurry of public 
interest and legislative activity,6 its importance derives from its ap-
2 Id. at214-215, 270 N.E.2dat395. 
3 G.L., c. 272, §53. 
4 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 907,915, 270N.E.2d389, 395. 
5 Id. at910-915, 270N.E.2dat392-395. 
6 A series of articles appeared in the Boston Globe from late October to mid-November 
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proach, for the decision represents a particular judicial response to 
two major challenges to the American criminal law system. The first 
is an attack upon a wide variety of statutes throughout the nation that 
define as "criminal" various forms of conduct that are essentially non-
violent, victimless, and no longer repugnant to the moral sensibilities 
of the community at large. Examples of such "criminal" conduct 
include stubbornness or incorrigibility, vagrancy,? public intoxica-
tion,8 and a wide range of consenting sexual relationships.9 While 
it is undoubted that stubborn behavior was opprobrious to the Puri-
tans, who first made such conduct criminal, the question which courts 
must confront is whether tradition, both legal and social, precludes 
a positive judicial response to the changing attitudes and configura-
tions of our society. The second challange to our criminal law system 
involves an attack on the rationale and structure of the juvenile court 
system. The United States Supreme Court's historic decision in the 
case of In re Gault, 10 the burgeoning of an identifiable youth culture, 
the alarming increase in violent crimes committed by young peo-
ple11 and the extraordinarily high rate of recidivism among juvenile 
offenders12 have combined to prompt a reassessment of the viability of 
the juvenile law system. Many persons have questioned whether the 
ideal of protection which is embodied in child status crimes such as 
stubbornness and which pervades the entire juvenile justice system 
is really a delusion, fostering and perpetuating second-class citizen-
ship for children. 
The proposition presented in the following pages is that the Su-
preme Judicial Court erred, as a matter of law and as a matter of public 
policy, in upholding the Commonwealth's 325-year-old stubborn 
child law. The line of argument will treat seriatim the issues of (a) 
governmental intrusion into family life, (b) due process, (c) sufficiency 
of the evidence, and finally (d) the applicability of the Fourteenth 
Amendment equal protection clause to the Brasher case. The narrowly 
technical legal analysis should be viewed within the context of the 
broad policy considerations articulated above, with an eye toward the 
creation of new socio-legal institutions for juveniles. 
1971. In addition, House Bills 2045 and 6226, discussed in detail in the concluding part 
of this article, were filed for the 1971 session of the Massachusetts legislature. 
7 While the basic vagrancy law in Massachusetts was struck down in Alegata v. 
Commonwealth, 353 Mass. 287, 231 N.E.2d 201 (1967), there are corollary statutes in 
Massachusetts which cover a similar range of activity. See G.L., c. 272, §§53, 63. 
8 The crime of public intoxication was repealed by the Massachusetts legislature by 
the Acts of 1971, c. 1076, §19, amending G.L., c. 272, §§3, 44-50. For a good discussion of 
this crime generally, see Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968). 
9 G.L., c. 272, §§16-21A, 26, 34, 35. 
10 387 u.s. 1 (1967). 
11 Bayh, Toward Juvenile Justice, 40 Am. Scholar 662, 663 (1971). According to 
Senator Bayh, chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Juvenile Delinquency, persons 
under 25 now account for more than 59 percent of violent crimes. 
12 Ibid. Senator Bayh places the recidivism rate at nearly 75 percent, higher than the 
comparable rate for adult offenders. 
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The first and most sweeping argument advanced by the appellant 
was that "[ i]nterference in the family to prevent disobedience is not 
... a proper function of the criminal law." 13 This constitutional 
challenge to the Massachusetts statute was advanced even though Miss 
Brasher was not in a traditional family situation when adjudged a 
stubborn child. In support of the asserted impropriety of state inter-
vention in the privacy of the family unit, appellant relied upon the 
biblical basis of the statute, the commandment to honor one's parents. 
Counsel pointed out that the incorporation of this religious tenet into 
the secular criminal code blurs the line between moral obligation and 
legal duty and is inconsistent with modern beliefs in the privacy of the 
family and the individual. A decision upholding the intra-family tort 
immunity rule in Massachusetts was cited by appellant for the prop-
osition that courts should be most reluctant to meddle in family 
affairs. 14 
Counsel for Miss Brasher could also have drawn upon a series of 
United States Supreme Court decisions concerning education. In 
Piera v. Society of Sisters, 15 the Court struck down an Oregon stat-
ute which required parents to send their children of ages 8 to 16 to a 
public rather than a private or parochial school in the district where 
they resided. Holding that this legislation constituted an unreason-
able interference with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct 
the upbringing of their children, the Court said: 
In this day and under our civilization, the child of man is his 
parents' child and not the state's .... It is not seriously de-
batable that the parental right to guide one's child intellectually 
and religiously is a most substantial part of the liberty and free-
dom of the parent.l6 
The Court thus crystallized thoughts first expressed two years earlier 
when it had held unconstitutional a Nebraska statute that prohibited 
the teaching of a language other than English to public school eighth 
graders. 17 
Surprisingly, Miss Brasher's. counsel did not concentrate on the 
Supreme Court's decision in Griswold v. Connecticut18 in connec-
tion with the family privacy argument. In that case, a Connecticut 
statute which prohibited the prescription of contraceptive devices to 
married couples, and even their use by married couples, was held to 
be an unconstitutional invasion of the privacy of the marital relation-
ship. The majority opinion rested upon a constitutionally protected 
13 Brief for Defendant at 6, Commonwealth v. Brasher. 
14 Ibid. The case cited by appellant was Oliveria v. Oliveria, 305 Mass. 297, 25 N.E. 
2d 766 (1940). For a full undersianding of the Massachusetts policy supporting the 
intrafamily tort immunity rule, see also Luster v. Luster, 299 Mass. 480, 13 N.E.2d 438 
(1938). 
1s 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
16 Id. at518. 
17 Meyerv. Nebraska,262U.S. 390 (1923). 
18 381 U.S.479(1965). 
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right of privacy emanating from the "penumbra" of the First, Third, 
Fourth and Ninth Amendments. 19 Although this decision concerned 
only the parental aspect of the family relationship, it has been sug-
gested that its right of privacy concept could be extended to cover the 
parent -child relationship. 2° 
Even with this buttressing, appellant's argument that the family 
unit is sacrosanct and beyond the reach of the police power clashes 
sharply with the well-established parens patriae doctrine. Under this 
theory, both the state and the parents have an interest in the welfare of 
children, and while parents are afforded maximum latitude in child-
rearing, there is no immunity from state interference should circum-
stances dictate it. Although this view emerged at the turn of the cen-
tury with the birth of the juvenile court system,21 it was not embraced 
by the United States Supreme Court until 1943 in the case of Prince v. 
Massachusetts. 22 In that case a legal guardian was found guilty of 
contributing to the delinquency of her nine-year-old ward by per-
mitting the child to sell religious publications on a public street in 
violation of Massachusetts child labor laws.23 From an adverse 
determination by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,24 
the guardian appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which 
was thus squarely presented with the conflicting claims of the parents 
and the state as to control over the child. In a decision which stressed 
the interests of the state, the Supreme Court said 
the family itself is not beyond regulation in the public interest. 
... Acting to guard the general interest in youth's well being, 
the state as parens patriae may restrict the parents' control by 
requiring school attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child's 
labor and in many other ways.25 [Footnotes omitted.] 
It should be noted, however, that the state child labor laws at issue 
in Prince were intended to protect children from certain abuses, even 
in instances where the parents had consented to the prohibited child 
labor. This idea of protecting the child from abuse, even as against 
his parents, is most clearly delineated in a line of cases dealing with 
emergency medical care for children.26 Courts have allowed state 
interference to save the life of a child, even if the parents have opposed 
treatment as a violation of their First Amendment right to freedom of 
relig~n. For example, in State v. Perricone, 27 a New Jersey couple 
19 I d. at 484. 
2° Katz, When Parents FailS ( 197·1 ). 
21 A thorough study of this philosophy is presented in Platt, The Child Sawrs ( 1969). 
22 321 U.S.I58 (1944). 
23 G.L., c. 149, §69. 
24 Commonwealth v. Prince, 313 Mass. 223,46 N.E.2d 755 ( 1943). 
25321 U.S.I58, 166(1944). 
26 People ex"tel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769 (1952); Morrison 
v. State, 252 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952); Mitchell v. Davis, 205 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1947); d. Matter of Seiferth, 309 N.Y. 80, 127 N.E.2d 820 (1955); In re Hudson, 13 
Wash. 2d 673, 126 P.2d 765 (1942). 
27 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751 (1962). 
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refused to consent to a blood transfusion for their child, who was in 
imminent danger of death. The parents alleged that their religious 
scruples as Jehovah's Witnesses compelled their inaction. The New 
Jersey Supreme Court upheld the right of the state to find the parents 
guilty of statutory neglect and allowed a lower court to appoint a tem-
porary guardian to consent to a transfusion for the child despite 
parental protest. In summing up its feelings, the New Jersey Supreme 
Court cited Prince for the proposition that "[p ]arents may be free to 
become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow that they are free, 
in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their children before 
they have reached the age of full and legal discretion when they can 
make that choice for themselves. "28 
The goal of protecting the welfare of children in society is a basic 
element in most statutes regulating the family. Massachusetts, lil_<e all 
other jurisdictions, has laws governing compulsory education,29 child 
labor,30 parental neglect,31 and adoption.32 Statutes governing de-
linquent children33 are concerned with protection of the community 
as well as the welfare of the child, but the statutes address the problem 
of delinquent children at the point where the delinquent conduct 
offends the community at large. In Brasher, however, the Supreme 
Judicial Court saw a harm to the community in the very fact of family 
disharmony: 
While the State defers to the parents with respect to most deci-
sions on family matters, it has an interest in insuring the exis-
tence of harmonious relations between family members, and 
between the family unit and the rest of public society. To protect 
this interest, the State may properly require that unemancipated 
children obey the reasonable and lawful commands of their 
parents, and it may impose criminal penalties on the children if 
they persistently disobey such commands. The State is not power-
less to prevent or control situations which threaten the proper 
functioning of a family unit as an important segment of the total 
society. 34 
If it is conceded that the present statutory scheme gives Massachu-
setts the power to intervene in family life, the crucial questions con-
cern the limitations placed upon the exercise of that power. State laws 
imposing criminal liability for conduct occurring within the family 
circle, like other criminal statutes, must certainly conform to consti-
tutional standards such as due process. If the Commonwealth's stub-
born child statute were found to be "so vague that men of common 
28 Id. at 473-474, 181 A.2d at 757, citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 1-58, 170 
(1944). 
29 G.L., cc. 76, 77. 
3oG.L.,c.l49,§§53-105. 
"G.L., c. 273 
32 G.L., c. 210. 
33 G.L., c. 119. 
34 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 907,913,270 N.E.2d389, 394. 
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intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its 
application,"35 the law would have to be struck down as a violation 
of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Brasher, 
however, was not the first case to challenge the constitutionality of 
G.L., c. 272, §53 on void-for-vagueness grounds. Within the past four 
years, the Supreme Judicial Court has heard appeals from persons 
convicted of being "disturbers of the peace," "common night walkers," 
and "idle and disorderly," which are categories of persons lumped 
together with stubborn children under G.L., c. 272, §53. In separate 
decisions, the Court held that each of those phrases was specific 
enough not to deny due process of law.36 In so holding, the Court 
developed a common method of analysis which has resurfaced in 
Brasher. 
A legata v. Commonwealth31 was the first in this sequence of de-
cisions and the paradigm of this analytical mode. In A legata, the 
petitioner had been convicted of being an "idle and disorderly per-
son" under G.L., c. 272, §53. On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court 
sustained the conviction, holding that the section of the statute in 
question is not impermissibly vague. The Court first distinguished 
between idle and disorderly, deeming the former to be "a neutral term 
today, implying no misconduct."38 Disorderly, however, was said to 
be a "word of common understanding" specific enough to give po-
tential offenders sufficient warning as to what conduct was pro-
scribed.39 That due process standard, i.e., "common understanding," 
against which the conduct in question was measured was first enun-
ciated by the Supreme Judicial Court in Carpenter v. Common-
wealth.40 (The United States Supreme Court has used the same 
standard in the void-for-vagueness area.41 ) In ascertaining the com-
mon meaning of disorderly, the Supreme Judicial Court looked to the 
legislative history of the statute, particularly the 1943 legislative 
recodification which eliminated some redundant sections of the statute, 
thereby giving disorderly more precise content. The Court also relied 
on Section 250.2 of the proposed draft of the Model Penal Code, 
which restricts the meaning of disorderly to instances of fighting, 
35 This standard was held to be the applicable test in the void-for-vagueness area in 
Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926), and was reiterated in Lan-
zetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939). See also Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284 
(1963) (reversing the convictions, under a breach of the peace statute, of six black youths 
for playing basketball in an all-white park), and Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 ( 1965) 
(holding unconstitutional a broadly drawn subversive activities statute and granting 
injunctive relief against its use for harassment of civil rights groups). 
36 Commonwealth v. Jarrett, 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 833, 269 N.E.2d 657 ("disturber of 
the peace"); Thomes v. Commonwealth, 355 Mass. 203, 243 N.E.2d 821 (1969) ("com-
mon night walker"); Alegata v. Commonwealth, 353 Mass. 287, 231 N.E.2d 201 (1967) 
("idle and disorderly"). 
37 353Mass.287,231 N.E.2d(l967). 
38 Id. at 302,231 N.E.2d at 210. See also Hawaii v. Anduha, 48 F.2d 171 (9th Cir. 1931). 
39 Ibid. 
40 325 Mass. 519,91 N.E.2d666(1950). 
41 See n.35 supra. 
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threatening, unreasonable noise, abusive language, or creation of 
a hazardous condition. Concluding from the code's description that 
disorderly conduct included only "activities which intentionally 
tend to disturb the public tranquility, or alarm or provoke others,"42 
the Court found no violation of due process. 
As it had in A legata, the Court in Brasher judged the statute against 
the Carpenter standard of "common understanding." Once again, it 
conducted a lengthy review of the legislative history, including the 
evolution of the appropriate indictment forms. The Court drew a 
positive inference from the legislature's failure to change the stubborn 
child law despite numerous amendments and periodic reconsolida-
tions of it.43 In Brasher, however, the Court was hard pressed to find 
anything in the legislative history or in external sources which would 
help to define stubbornness. Instead, it relied upon the state's "long 
experience" with the law to delineate a punishable zone of behavior: 
Single, infrequent or isolated refusals to obey such commands do 
not constitute a crime. Neither do manifestations of stubborn-
ness which do not amount to refusals to obey commands. The 
law clearly does not make mere expressions of disagreement or 
differences of views or opinions between parent and child a 
crime on the part of the child. But it does not permit or excuse 
stubborn refusals by children to obey reasonable and lawful com-
mands of their parents or persons similarly situated on a claim 
that it is merely the exercise of a right of dissent. 44 
[T]he Commonwealth is required to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt ... that ... the refusal was stubborn in the sense that 
it was wilful, obstinate and persistent for a period of time.45 
The foregoing exercise in semantics indicates how difficult it is to de-
fine the offense of "stubbornness." The Court's effort raises as many 
questions as it answers. Where is the line between disagreement and 
disobedience? Could a single persistent refusal to obey a lawful com~ 
mand for a period of time qualify as stubbornness, or must there be a 
pattern of refusals over a period of time? How long is that period of 
time? For that matter, what is a "reasonable" command? 
More importantly, the Brasher Court failed to recognize that the 
legislative history, which had been so helpful in defining disorderly 
in A legata, served only to underscore the ambiguity and essential 
subjectivity of stubborn behavior. Rather than establishing a clear 
"common understanding" of stubbornness, the past has illuminated 
the difficulty of developing that understanding. The first stubborn 
child law, passed in 1646, provided that 
[i]f a man have a stubborn or rebellious son of sufficient years 
42 353Mass. 287,304,231 N.E.2d201,2l1 (1967). 
45 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 907, 909, 270 N .E:2d 389, 392. 
44 I d. at 911-912, 270 N .E.2d at 393. 
45 Id. at9ll, 270N.E.2dat393. 
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of understanding, viz., sixteen, which will not obey the voice of 
his father or the voice of his mother, and that when they have 
chastened him will not harken unto them . . . , such a son 
shall be put to death.46 
Attaching the death penalty to the crime of stubbornness is repugnant 
to modern moral sensibilities. Yet, if the punishment can in any sense 
be said to fit the crime, its severity in this instance is a testament to 
how harshly the Puritans viewed such behaviot as compared with our 
attitudes toward it today. 
It is also clear that no common understanding of "stubbornness" 
can be said to exist in contemporary society. For example, affluent 
parents are likely to be permissive child-rearers and may have a greater 
tolerance for "stubborn" behavior than parents in lower economic 
classes, who tend to be strict disciplinarians.H Statistics on stubborn 
child commitments to the Massachusetts Department of Youth Ser-
vices from 1968 to 1970 seem to support this theory. While there are no 
clear figures on family income, an analysis of other factors such as 
home structure, place of residence, and race suggest that most of those 
children who have been committed come from either white working-
class families or from lower-middle-class families generally.48 In 
addition to different interpretations of "stubbornness" within the strata 
of society, husbands and wives themselves differ as to what constitutes 
stubbornness. With such a divergence of opinion, only specific con-
duct labeled as stubborn by the legislature can create the common 
understanding sought by the Brasher Court. Judicial pronounce-
ments seem to add confusion, not clarity, to any definition of "stub-
born" behavior. 
Interestingly, a susceptibility to widely varying interpretations and 
subjective determinations had been deplored by the Supreme Judicial 
Court in Alegata. While it upheld the "idle and disorderly persons" 
section of G.L., c. 272, §53, the Court struck down three other statutes. 
One of those had provided for the punishment of "suspicious per-
sons."49 In holding that that law violated the due process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court said: 
The problem with suspicion is that it is a subjective term incap-
able of providing any intelligible standard to guide either sus-
pect or court. The absence of limiting standards leaves the citizen 
at "the mercy of the officers' whim or caprice."50 
46 3 Shurtleff; Records of the Governor and Company of Massachusetts Bay Colony 
in New England 1628-1686, at 101 (1853-1854). This same passage may be found in 
Bremner, Children and Youth in America 38 (1970). See generally Moody, The School 
of Good Manners, as excerpted in Bremner, id. at 33-34. 
47 Bronfenbrenner, Socialization and Social Class Through Time and Space, in 
Readings in Social Psychology 424 (1958). 
48 Burling, The Stubborn Child Law and the Massachusetts Department of Youth 
Services, May I, 1970 (unpublished paper for Prof. Vorenberg's criminal law seminar, 
Harvard Law School; available in the office of the Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law). 
49 G.L., c. 41, §98. 
50 353 Mass. 287,292-293,231 N.E.2d201, 205 (1967). 
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The stubborn child law, it is submitted, should fall within the same 
prohibition. 
Moreover, the language in a recent United States Supreme Court 
opinion, Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 51 would indicate that the Su-
preme Judicial Court should have been more sensitive to the sub-
jectivity issue. In that case, petitioners were convicted under a city 
ordinance which prohibited the sidewalk assembly of three or more 
persons conducting themselves in "a manner annoying to persons 
passing by." The Supreme Court held the ordinance unconstitutional. 
Addressing itself to the vagueness issue, the Court commented: 
Conduct that annoys some people does not annoy others. Thus, 
the ordinance is vague not in the sense that it requires a pt;rson to 
conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible norma-
tive standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct 
is specified at all. As a result, "men of common intelligence must 
necessarily guess at its meaning."52 
The Court's message would probably be the same if stubborn conduct, 
instead of annoying conduct, was in question. Nonetheless, even 
though "stubbornness" might be held unconstitutionally vague when 
measured against due process standards as ordinarily applied to 
adults, such standards have frequently been applied less stringently 
to juveniles. Since the Brasher case was a delinquency proceeding, 
often technically characterized as civil rather than criminal,53 it is 
possible that the Supreme Judicial Court had in mind a different idea 
of due process than would have been applied in the case of an adult. 
A detailed assessment of the due process rights of children is beyond 
the scope of this article, but it is important to note that in 1967 the 
United States Supreme Court, in In re Gault,54 held that the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment extends to juvenile court 
proceedings. Specifically, juveniles are entitled to adequate notice, 
the right to counsel, the right to invoke the privilege against self-
incrimination, and the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses. 55 
Although the thrust of Gault was clearly in the direction of insuring 
full fundamental due process to minors in juvenile court proceedings, 
the issues before the Court concerned only procedural due process. As 
a result, some doubt has developed as to whether Gault also guaran-
teed substantive due process, which embraces the void-for-vagueness 
doctrine argued in Brasher. 
The highest court of at least one state has expressly construed Gault 
to encompass substantive as well as procedural due process. In the 
case of People v. Allen,56 the New York Court of Appeals reversed 
51402 u.s. 611 (1971). 
52! d. at 614. 
5! See, e.g., Petition of Morin, 95 N.H. 518,520, 68A.2d668, 670(1949). 
54 387U.S.I (1967). 
55 Id. at33, 41, 55, 56, respectively. 
56 22 N.Y.2d465, 239N.E.2d879, 293 N.Y.S.2d280(1968). 
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he convictions of three juveniles, all of whom, under a New York 
statute,57 had been adjudged "wayward minors ... morally de-
praved or in danger of becoming morally depraved." Specifically, 
two of the youths had been suspected of narcotics use, and the third 
was believed to have engaged in illicit sexual intercourse. Acute pa-
rental disapproval of the alleged misconduct brought each case to 
bar, and the trial court's feeling that all three children were beyond 
the effective control of their parents led to guilty findings as to each of 
the three. Although the court of appeals did not declare the wayward 
minor statute void on vagueness grounds,58 it left the clear impres-
sion that future prosecutions based upon the statute would be 
difficult to sustain: "[T]his procedural requirement [of due process] 
should apply as well to the substantive definition of acts committed 
by juveniles which are made the subject of corrective or penal disci-
pline."59 
Other jurisdictions, however, have failed to follow New York's 
substantive interpretation of Gault. A 1970 New Jersey Superior Court 
decision60 upheld a statute which made "habitual vagrancy," "incor-
rigibility," "immorality," "growing up in idleness or delinquency," 
"idly roaming the streets at night," and engaging in conduct "en-
dangering the morals, health or general welfare of said child" all 
independent bases for a finding of delinquency.61 The court ex-
pressed the belief that Gault applied only to procedural due process, 
and once procedural requirements were fulfilled, the court was not 
compelled to look to the substantive nature of the act. 
An unequivocal determination of the issue of substantive due pro-
cess for juveniles is not likely to be made until the United States 
Supreme Court is squarely confronted with the question. The two 
most recent Supreme Court cases on juvenile rights shed no further 
light on this question since both involved further procedural issues.62 
Perhaps a case like Brasher will be the vehicle for placing the sub-
stantive due process issue before the United States Supreme Court. 
For the moment, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has 
missed a significant opportunity to expand the civil rights of children 
in the Commonwealth. 
After the Court in Brasher had concluded that the statute in ques-
tion was not unconstitutionally vague, it was not surprising that it 
quickly rejected appellant's sufficiency of evidence argument. Under 
57 N.Y. CodeCrim. Proc.,§913-a(McKinneySupp.l970). 
58 Just before this article went to press, a three-judge federal court struck down the 
New York wayward minor statute. One of the major grounds of the decision was that 
the language of the statute was unconstitutionally vague. Gesicki v. Oswald, Civ. No. 
71-3276 (S.D.N.Y., Dec. 22, 1971). 
59 22 N.Y.2d465, 466,239 N.E.2d879, 880,293 N.Y.S.2d280, 282 (1968). 
60 State in the InterestofL.N., 109 N.J. Super. 278, 263A.2d 150 (1970). 
61 Id. at 282-283,263 A.2d at 152. The statute itself is N:J. Stat. Ann., §2A: 4-14 (1966). 
62 McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (right to jury trial in juvenile court); 
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (standard of proof in juvenile delinquency proceed-
ings). 
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the standards which it had set out, the prosecution's case could fail 
because of insufficient evidence only if Miss Brasher's disobedience 
was predicated upon unlawful or unreasonable commands. Ironically, 
on the facts of the Brasher case, just such an argument was available 
to Miss Brasher, though it was not clearly made in her brief. One 
possible ground for finding the command unlawful would be that it 
violated a constitutionally protected right. The episode which appar-
ently triggered the stubborn child coiJlplaint was Miss Brasher's out-
burst after being ordered to take a physical examination. If that 
command could have been interpreted as infringing on her constitu-
tionally guaranteed right of privacy,63 her refusal to obey would have 
been legally justifiable, and her adjudication as a stubborn child 
could not stand. Although there are no cases directly on point, counsel 
for Miss Brasher could have analogized to two United States Supreme 
Court cases involving orders of a lower court for a physical examina-
tion. In the early case of Union Pacific Railways v. Botsford,64 and 
later in Sibbach v. Wilson and Co.,65 the Supreme Court spoke of 
the right of each person to control over his or her own body.66 In each 
instance, the Court held that a refusal to submit to a physical examina-
tion could not be made subject to a contempt citation. 
The most interesting constitutional question raised by the Brasher 
case was neither clearly articulated in the appellant's brief nor com-
mented upon by the Supreme Judicial Court in its opinion; this ques-
tion concerns the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. May a child be punished for "stubbornness" when the parent 
sharing responsibility for the child's illegal acts is untouched by the 
law? This question is intended to reach the policy basis of the Brasher 
decision: that children are somehow less equal before the law than 
adults are. 
The equal protection clause does not require that all laws apply 
equally to everyone.67 Indeed, much of our legislation is based upon 
classifications which of necessity distinguish between groups of 
people engaged in various activities. If such a classification is not 
arbitrary and unreasonable and is rationally related to a legitimate 
legislative purpose, it is constitutionally permissible.68 The equal 
protection clause requires only that all who are similarly sitJ\ated 
before the law be similarly treated by the law.69 Thus, a classifica~on 
which is overinclusive-providing for the punishment of innocent 
as well as guilty people-will be struck down.7° A classification which 
63 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
64 141 u.s. 250(1891). 
65 312U.S.l (1941). 
66 141 U.S.250(1891);312U.S.l, 14, 17-19(1941). 
67 Norvell v. Illinois, 373 U.S. 420(1963); Moreyv. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957). 
68 Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilots Commrs., 330 U.S. 552 (1947); Metropolitan 
Casualty Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U.S. 580 (1935). 
69 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 ( 1964). 
70 Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 
233 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
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is underinclusive-providing for the punishment of only one of sev-
eral people or groups engaged in the same conduct-will also be held 
unconstitutional. 71 
The leading United States Supreme Court case on underinclusive 
classification is Skinner v. Oklahoma.n Petitioner in that case had 
been convicted once for theft and twice for armed robbery. A court 
order requiring him to undergo a vasectomy under Oklahoma's Habit-
ual Criminal Sterilization Act73 was affirmed by the highest court of 
Oklahoma. Petitioner appealed to the United States Supreme Court, 
averring that the sterilization act violated his constitutional rights. 
While the Court might have rested its decision on the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the Eighth Amendment's 
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, it chose instead 
to rely on the equal protection clause. In an opinion by Justice Doug-
las, the Court noted that "polite" felons such as embezzlers were ex-
cluded from the reach of the sterilization act regardless of the magni-
tude of their offense, but that a thief who continues to steal only 
chickens could be sterilized. The vice of the statute, then, was its 
unreasonable discrimination against some classes of felons. The 
Court articulated the following general proposition: 
The guaranty of "equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the 
protection of equal laws." ... When the law lays an unequal 
hand on those who have committed intrinsically the same quality 
of offense and sterilizes one and not the other, it had made as 
invidious a discrimination as if it had selected a particular race 
or nationality for oppressive treatment.74 
The theory of underinclusive classification has even greater applic-
ability in situations where an act to which criminal liability attaches 
requires the participation of two or more parties. For example, in 
conspiracy cases involving two coconspirators, if one of them is ac-
quitted, the other must also be acquitted.75 A more graphic illustra-
tion is presented by statutes regulating sexual behavior. In McLaugh-
lin v. Florida,76 the Supreme Court struck down a statute which 
made it a crime for an interracial couple to occupy the same room at 
night. No proof of intercourse was required. In developing its equal 
protection argument, the Court alluded to a more clear-cut example: 
Had the Court been presented with a statute that, for example, 
prohibited any Negro male from having carnal knowledge of a 
white female and penalized only the Negro, such a statute would 
71 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 ( 1942). 
72 Ibid. 
73 0kla.Stat.Ann.,tit.57,§§171 et seq. (1935). 
14 316 U.S. 535,541 (1942). 
75 Eyman v. Deutsch, 92 Ariz. 82, 373 P.2d 716 (1962); People v. Regan, 351 Ill. App. 
550, 115 N.E.2d 817 (1953). See also Kadish and Paulsen, Criminal Law and Its Processes 
493 (2d ed. 1969). 
76 379 U.S. 184 (1964). 
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unquestionably have been held to deny equal protection even 
though it applied equally to all to whom it applied.77 
There is a possibility that the stubborn child law involves an under-
inclusive classification akin to those noted above. This argument 
hinges on whether stubbornness is solely the fault of the child or 
whether it is a condition which is the product of the joint behavior 
of both child and parents and for which both parties must accept 
responsibility. If the former is true, and that appears to be the implicit 
assumption upon which the modern statute is predicated, there is no 
equal protection problem. If the latter theory is sound, it could be 
argued that a stubborn child law that completely excludes the parents, 
not even requiring them to submit to family counseling, constitutes 
a constitutionally impermissible classification. Although there is 
clearly a need for sophisticated sociological and psychological fact-
finding before either assumption can be validated, there is sufficient 
evidence supporting a dual responsibility theory to merit further 
investigation. A recent study of stubborn child commitments in 
Massachusetts indicated that close to 80 percent of all stubborn child-
ren committed to the Department of Youth Services between July 1968 
and January 1970 came from broken homes.78 The case histories of 
these children revealed many instances of mental illness among their 
parents, violence in their homes, and arbitrary exercises of parental 
authority.79 In many instances, the need to remove the child from 
his family environment appeared to be the controlling factor in the 
judicial disposition of the case.80 A report submitted to the President's 
Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice 
shared this perspective: "[W]ho can assert that defective parental roles 
and practices do not frequently bear a heavy responsibility for 'stub-
bornness'?"81 Even the Puritan architects of the precursors to to-
day's stubborn child law recognized a dual responsibility for stubborn-
ness in children. Under an enactment of the Massachusetts Bay Colony, 
parents "negligent of their duty ... whereby children and servants 
become rude, stubborn and unruly" could lose custody of their child-
ren.82 Unlike modern legislatures and courts, which seldom relate 
parental neglect and sibling incorrigibility, the Puritans considered 
the two together. 
If the social sciences can confirm the theory of dual responsibility 
for stubbornness, thus establishing an underinclusive classification, 
77 Id. at 190 n.8. 
78 Burling, The Stubborn Child Law and the Massachusetts Department of Youth 
Services, May I, 1970, Table 4A at 12 (unpublished paper for Prof. Vorenberg's criminal 
law seminar, Harvard Law School; available in the office of the Annual Survey of Massa-
chusetts Law). 
79 ld. Appendix B. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Fox, The Juvenile Court, Its Context, Problems and Opportunities, in Brief for 
Defendant at 5, Commonwealth v. Brasher. 
82 Whitmore, The Colonial Laws of Massachusetts 26 ( 1887). 
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they would do more than undermine Brasher. "[T]he course of the 1 
law has been ... toward increasing support of parental authority,"83 
a trend perfectly consistent with the hierarchical structure of the 
Western family and the view that the parent has an unchallenged 
superiority over his child. Judges have incorporated that social 
philosophy into their opinions, as evidenced by Brasher. The ques-
tion presented here is whether judges may continue that trend or 
whether they should strike a new balance between traditional philo- , 
sophical premises and the constitutional mandate of equal protection.) 
Incorrigibility legislation such as the Massachusetts stubborn 
child law opens the way to a second equal protection issue. Although 
this issue can only be mentioned here, it is important that it be raised 
because of its potential impact on our legal and social system. Put 
most simply: Is it an invidious discrimination to make conduct 
engaged in by children quasi-criminal if the same conduct is per-
missible in adults? This formulation only skims the surface of the 
problem because it does not take into account the existence of unique 
institutional relationships in which children alone are forced to exist. 
More narrowly phrased, then, the issue becomes: Is it an invidious 
discrimination to punish children for behavior incident to their 
social status as children, where such offenses do not even exist for 
adults due to differing institutional arrangements?84 
At the beginning of this article, there was a caveat that the legal 
analysis contained herein should be viewed in terms of the underlying 
policy issues raised by the Brasher case. An attempt has been made to 
demonstrate the interrelationship between specific legislation in the 
field of juvenile law, in this instance the Massachusetts stubborn 
child law, and the basic rationale of the juvenile justice system. If it 
can be assumed that the stubborn child law needs to be changed, 
such contemplated changes must be viewed within the context of the 
whole juvenile court system. It may be necessary, however, to question 
whether essential improvements can be accomplished within existing 
structures. In this regard, the United States Supreme Court's apprais-
al of the juvenile court system in Gault merits scrutiny: 
A boy is charged with misconduct. The boy is committed to an 
institution where he may be restrained of liberty for years. . . . 
His world becomes a building with white-washed walls, regi-
mented routine, and institutional hours .... Instead of mother 
and father and sisters and brothers and friends and classmates, 
his world is peopled by guards, custodians, state employees, and 
"delinquents" confined with him for anything from wayward-
ness to rape and homicide.85 
83 Kleinfeld, The Balance of Power Among Infants, Their Parents and the State, 4 
Fam. L.Q. 410, 434 (1970). 
84 Laws punishing stubborn children may thus be characterized as punishing a 
child partly because of his status as a child. For a discussion of this issue, see Sidman, 
The Stubborn Child Law: Law and Order in the Home, 6 Fam. L.Q. 23 (1972). 
85 387 U.S.I, 27 (1967). 
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A recent television documentary, "This Child is Rated X,"86 indi-
cated that since the Gault decision in 1967, the overall juvenile justice 
system has not improved appreciably.87 The present system can 
hardly be deemed a rational means for providing "that children be 
both safeguarded from abuses and given opportunities for growth 
into free and independent well-developed men and citizens."88 
In 1971, the Massachusetts legislature considered two bills which 
would have materially altered the stubborn child law. One would 
have required a 35-day counseling period between the time a stubborn 
child complaint is filed in juvenile or district court and the time of the 
court's disposition of the case.89 During that interval, psychologists 
and social workers would work with the parties to the complaint, 
attempting to effect a reconciliation that would obviate the need for 
state intervention. The other piece of legislation would have grouped 
stubborn children, runaways, and truants into a new category, "child 
in need of supervision. "90 The appellation "stubborn child" would 
have been eliminated, but the bill's definition of child in need of 
superoision was almost identical to the Brasher court's definition of 
stubbornness: "Persistently refusing to obey the reasonable commands 
of his parent or legal guardian resulting in said parent's or guardian's 
inability to adequately care for and protect said child .... "91 Under 
this bill, a "child in neep of supervision" could not have been placed 
in any institution operated for the detention of delinquents. Instead, 
such a child would either remain with his parents, under the super-
vision of court clinics or community counseling facilities, or be placed 
with other authorized child care agencies. The parts of G.L., c. 272, 
§53 dealing with stubborn children and runaways would have been 
repealed. 
Although neither bill was passed by the legislature, the second one 
has been refiled for consideration during the 1972 legislative session. 
This legislation, however, should incorporate the compulsory family 
counseling provision of the first bill, which should be a feature of any 
new law that retains a category corresponding to "stubborn children." 
Such an amendment to the refiled bill would insure that some serious 
effort will be made to resolve the family difficulties prior to invoking 
the court's jurisdiction. It would guard against the arbitrary and 
unreasonable use of the stubborn child statute by an inept parent and, 
in fact, might reduce considerably the number of stubborn child com-
plaints filed with the courts. Finally, a provision for compulsory family 
counseling would accord a greater measure of equal protection by in-
volving the parent as well as the child in the legal process. 
86 NBC documentary telecast May I, 1971. 
87 For corroboration of this point, see Bayh, Toward Juvenile Justice, 40 Am. 
Scholar 662 ( 1971 ). 
88 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944). 
89 House Bill2045. 
90 House Bill6226. 
91 Ibid. 
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The major advantage of the second bill is the elimination of the 
stigma of delinquency from children whose behavior has been merely 
"stubborn" and the accompanying separate treatment of such non-
delinquents. This bill would reduce the chance that stubborn children 
would become real criminals, since they would not be associating 
with the hard-core delinquents usually found in juvenile detention 
facilities and would not be "learning" from them. The delineation 
between children who are in trouble and genuine juvenile lawbreakers 
is of critical importance if the juvenile justice system is to attempt to 
fulfill its goals of protection and rehabilitation. The major drawback 
of the refiled proposal is that it continues the definitional problems 
which so obviously plagued the Brasher court. Perhaps the existing 
general language should be supplemented with a list of specific acts 
that would help to describe a "child in need of supervision." This 
technique is commonly used in drafting legislation, usually ·having 
the effect of limiting the sweep of the statute. The legislature should 
also look to the eleven states92 that have created special statutory 
categories, exclusive of delinquency, which are very much like "child 
in need of supervision." The experience of these states should be 
investigated to determine whether their statutes provide the substance 
or merely the illusion of reform. 
An alternative to new legislation is simply the repeal of the old stub-
born child law. It will be argued that such a step would create a vac-
uum, leaving parents of difficult children without legal recourse. In 
responding to that contention, it is worth reconsidering Miss Brasher's 
initial argument that parent-child disputes should not come within 
the province of the court system at all. In When Parents Fail, a book 
about the process of state intervention in the face of family breakdown, 
Professor Sanford N. Katz pinpointed the state's concern with the 
family: 
The state places a high priority on a stable and independent par-
ent-child relationship. To maintain this autonomy, the state, 
through its laws, imposes upon the parents specific minimum 
responsibilities and requires that they fulfill certain basic needs 
of their children. Without regard to priority, these are determined 
to be the child's need for financial security, health, education, 
morality, and respect for people and authority.93 
It is questionable whether the above needs can be met by subjecting 
stubborn children to the criminal or legal process. 
Justice Blackmun, in his recent opinion in McKeiver v. Pennsyl-
92 Fla. Stat. Ann., §39.01 (Supp. 1971); Ill. Ann. Stat., c. 37, §702-3 (Smith-Hurd 
Supp. 1971); Kan. Stat. Ann., §38-802 (Supp. 1970); Md. Ann. (:ode, art. 26, §70-1 (Supp. 
1970); Neb. Rev. Stat., c. 43, §201 (Supp. 1968); N.Y. Family Court Act, §712 (Supp. 
1970); N.C. Gen. Stat., §7A-278 (1969); Okla. Stat. Ann., tit. 10, §llOl (Supp. 1970); 
R.I. Stat. §14-1-3 (1969); Vt. Stat. Ann., tit. 33, §632 (Supp. 1971); Wash. Rev. Code Ann., 
§13.04.010 (1962). 
93 Katz, When Parents Fail9( 1971). 
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vania,94 suggested that the abolition of the juvenile court system may 
be foreseeable. "Perhaps that ultimate disillusionment will come one 
day, but for the moment we are disinclined to give impetus to it."95 
In opposition to Justice Blackmun's statement, it is submitted that the 
time for the creation of new institutions has already com~. The Brasher 
case illustrates that children in trouble are not receiving the kind of 
"comprehensive, integrated, and humane treatment which they need 
and which the juvenile court system has long promised. The mono-
lithic reform school approach to juvenile justice must be replaced by 
flexible, truly individualized disposition. To that end, new and widely 
differing structures must be created to offer a range of distinctive 
treatments. Court clinics and community treatment facilities represent 
the first tentative steps in that direction, yet they might be more bene-
ficially used as adjuncts to new child care units, rather than as ad-
juncts to the courts. These new centers might bring together lawyers, 
physicians, psychologists, social workers, educators, and recreational 
specialists and serve as a clearinghouse for juvenile problems, an 
operational think-tank which could refer children to auxilliary agen-
cies. There would, of course, be a place for courts in such a system, 
but as a last rather than a first resort. 
94 403 U.S. 528(1971). 
95 I d. at 551. 
LAWRENCE R. SIDMAN 
26
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1971 [1971], Art. 10
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1971/iss1/10
